/*
 * Copyright (C) 2009-2015 Tobias Brunner
 * Copyright (C) 2010 Martin Willi
 *
 * Copyright (C) secunet Security Networks AG
 *
 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
 * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
 * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
 * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
 *
 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
 * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
 * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
 * for more details.
 */

#include "eap_mschapv2.h"

#include <ctype.h>
#include <unistd.h>

#include <daemon.h>
#include <library.h>
#include <collections/enumerator.h>
#include <crypto/crypters/crypter.h>
#include <crypto/hashers/hasher.h>

typedef struct private_eap_mschapv2_t private_eap_mschapv2_t;

/**
 * Private data of an eap_mschapv2_t object.
 */
struct private_eap_mschapv2_t
{
	/**
	 * Public authenticator_t interface.
	 */
	eap_mschapv2_t public;

	/**
	 * ID of the server
	 */
	identification_t *server;

	/**
	 * ID of the peer
	 */
	identification_t *peer;

	/**
	 * challenge sent by the server
	 */
	chunk_t challenge;

	/**
	 * generated NT-Response
	 */
	chunk_t nt_response;

	/**
	 * generated Authenticator Response
	 */
	chunk_t auth_response;

	/**
	 * generated MSK
	 */
	chunk_t msk;

	/**
	 * EAP message identifier
	 */
	uint8_t identifier;

	/**
	 * MS-CHAPv2-ID (session ID, increases with each retry)
	 */
	uint8_t mschapv2id;

	/**
	 * Number of retries
	 */
	int retries;

	/**
	 * Provide EAP-Identity
	 */
	auth_cfg_t *auth;

	/**
	 * Current state
	 */
	enum {
		S_EXPECT_CHALLENGE,
		S_EXPECT_RESPONSE,
		S_EXPECT_SUCCESS,
		S_DONE,
	} state;
};

/**
 * OpCodes
 */
enum mschapv2_opcode_t
{
	MSCHAPV2_CHALLENGE = 1,
	MSCHAPV2_RESPONSE = 2,
	MSCHAPV2_SUCCESS = 3,
	MSCHAPV2_FAILURE = 4,
	MSCHAPV2_CHANGE_PASSWORD = 7,
};

/**
 * Names for OpCodes
 */
ENUM_BEGIN(mschapv2_opcode_names, MSCHAPV2_CHALLENGE, MSCHAPV2_FAILURE,
		"CHALLENGE",
		"RESPONSE",
		"SUCCESS",
		"FAILURE");
ENUM_NEXT(mschapv2_opcode_names, MSCHAPV2_CHANGE_PASSWORD, MSCHAPV2_CHANGE_PASSWORD, MSCHAPV2_FAILURE,
		"CHANGE_PASSWORD");
ENUM_END(mschapv2_opcode_names, MSCHAPV2_CHANGE_PASSWORD);

/**
 * Error codes
 */
enum mschapv2_error_t
{
	ERROR_RESTRICTED_LOGON_HOURS	= 646,
	ERROR_ACCT_DISABLED				= 647,
	ERROR_PASSWD_EXPIRED			= 648,
	ERROR_NO_DIALIN_PERMISSION		= 649,
	ERROR_AUTHENTICATION_FAILURE	= 691,
	ERROR_CHANGING_PASSWORD			= 709,
};

/**
 * Names for error codes
 */
ENUM_BEGIN(mschapv2_error_names, ERROR_RESTRICTED_LOGON_HOURS, ERROR_NO_DIALIN_PERMISSION,
		"ERROR_RESTRICTED_LOGON_HOURS",
		"ERROR_ACCT_DISABLED",
		"ERROR_PASSWD_EXPIRED",
		"ERROR_NO_DIALIN_PERMISSION");
ENUM_NEXT(mschapv2_error_names, ERROR_AUTHENTICATION_FAILURE, ERROR_AUTHENTICATION_FAILURE, ERROR_NO_DIALIN_PERMISSION,
		"ERROR_AUTHENTICATION_FAILURE");
ENUM_NEXT(mschapv2_error_names, ERROR_CHANGING_PASSWORD, ERROR_CHANGING_PASSWORD, ERROR_AUTHENTICATION_FAILURE,
		"ERROR_CHANGING_PASSWORD");
ENUM_END(mschapv2_error_names, ERROR_CHANGING_PASSWORD);

/* Length of the challenge */
#define CHALLENGE_LEN 16
/* Length of the response (see eap_mschapv2_response_t) */
#define RESPONSE_LEN 49
/* Length of the authenticator response string ("S=<...>") */
#define AUTH_RESPONSE_LEN 42
/* Name we send as authenticator */
#define MSCHAPV2_HOST_NAME "strongSwan"
/* Message sent on success */
#define SUCCESS_MESSAGE " M=Welcome2strongSwan"
/* Message sent on failure */
#define FAILURE_MESSAGE "E=691 R=1 C="
/* Length of the complete failure message */
#define FAILURE_MESSAGE_LEN (sizeof(FAILURE_MESSAGE) + CHALLENGE_LEN * 2)

/* Number of seconds to delay retries */
#define RETRY_DELAY 2
/* Maximum number of retries */
#define MAX_RETRIES 2

typedef struct eap_mschapv2_header_t eap_mschapv2_header_t;
typedef struct eap_mschapv2_challenge_t eap_mschapv2_challenge_t;
typedef struct eap_mschapv2_response_t eap_mschapv2_response_t;

/**
 * packed EAP-MS-CHAPv2 header struct
 */
struct eap_mschapv2_header_t
{
	/** EAP code (REQUEST/RESPONSE) */
	uint8_t code;
	/** unique message identifier */
	uint8_t identifier;
	/** length of whole message */
	uint16_t length;
	/** EAP type */
	uint8_t type;
	/** MS-CHAPv2 OpCode */
	uint8_t opcode;
	/** MS-CHAPv2-ID (equals identifier) */
	uint8_t ms_chapv2_id;
	/** MS-Length (defined as length - 5) */
	uint16_t ms_length;
	/** packet data (determined by OpCode) */
	uint8_t data[];
}__attribute__((__packed__));

/**
 * packed data for a MS-CHAPv2 Challenge packet
 */
struct eap_mschapv2_challenge_t
{
	/** Value-Size */
	uint8_t value_size;
	/** Challenge */
	uint8_t challenge[CHALLENGE_LEN];
	/** Name */
	uint8_t name[];
}__attribute__((__packed__));

/**
 * packed data for a MS-CHAPv2 Response packet
 */
struct eap_mschapv2_response_t
{
	/** Value-Size */
	uint8_t value_size;
	/** Response */
	struct
	{
		/* Peer-Challenge*/
		uint8_t peer_challenge[CHALLENGE_LEN];
		/* Reserved (=zero) */
		uint8_t peer_reserved[8];
		/* NT-Response */
		uint8_t nt_response[24];
		/* Flags (=zero) */
		uint8_t flags;
	} response;
	/** Name */
	uint8_t name[];
}__attribute__((__packed__));

/**
 * Length of the MS-CHAPv2 header
 */
#define HEADER_LEN (sizeof(eap_mschapv2_header_t))

/**
 * Length of the header as used for MS-CHAPv2 success packets (does
 * not include MS-CHAPv2-ID, MS-Length or any data, i.e. 3 octets)
 */
#define SHORT_HEADER_LEN (HEADER_LEN - 3)

/**
 * The minimum length of an MS-CHAPv2 Challenge packet (the name MUST be
 * at least one octet)
 */
#define CHALLENGE_PAYLOAD_LEN (HEADER_LEN + sizeof(eap_mschapv2_challenge_t))

/**
 * The minimum length of an MS-CHAPv2 Response packet
 */
#define RESPONSE_PAYLOAD_LEN (HEADER_LEN + sizeof(eap_mschapv2_response_t))


/**
 * Expand a 56-bit key to a 64-bit DES key by adding parity bits (odd parity)
 */
static chunk_t ExpandDESKey(chunk_t key)
{
	static const u_char bitmask[] =	{ 0xfe, 0xfc, 0xf8, 0xf0, 0xe0, 0xc0, 0x80 };
	int i;
	u_char carry = 0;
	chunk_t expanded;

	/* expand the 7 octets to 8 octets */
	expanded = chunk_alloc(8);
	for (i = 0; i < 7; i++)
	{
		expanded.ptr[i] = ((key.ptr[i] & bitmask[i]) >> i) | (carry << (8 - i));
		carry = key.ptr[i] & ~bitmask[i];
	}
	expanded.ptr[7] = carry << 1;

	/* add parity bits to each octet */
	for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
	{
		u_char val = expanded.ptr[i];
		val = (val ^ (val >> 4)) & 0x0f;
		expanded.ptr[i] |= (0x9669 >> val) & 1;
	}
	return expanded;
}

/**
 * Calculate the NT password hash (i.e. hash the (unicode) password with MD4)
 */
static status_t NtPasswordHash(chunk_t password, chunk_t *password_hash)
{
	hasher_t *hasher;
	hasher = lib->crypto->create_hasher(lib->crypto, HASH_MD4);
	if (hasher == NULL)
	{
		DBG1(DBG_IKE, "EAP-MS-CHAPv2 failed, no MD4 hasher available");
		return FAILED;
	}
	if (!hasher->allocate_hash(hasher, password, password_hash))
	{
		hasher->destroy(hasher);
		return FAILED;
	}
	hasher->destroy(hasher);
	return SUCCESS;
}

/**
 * Calculate the challenge hash (i.e. hash [peer_challenge | server_challenge |
 * username (without domain part)] with SHA1)
 */
static status_t ChallengeHash(chunk_t peer_challenge, chunk_t server_challenge,
							  chunk_t username, chunk_t *challenge_hash)
{
	chunk_t concat;
	hasher_t *hasher;
	hasher = lib->crypto->create_hasher(lib->crypto, HASH_SHA1);
	if (hasher == NULL)
	{
		DBG1(DBG_IKE, "EAP-MS-CHAPv2 failed, SHA1 not supported");
		return FAILED;
	}
	concat = chunk_cata("ccc", peer_challenge, server_challenge, username);
	if (!hasher->allocate_hash(hasher, concat, challenge_hash))
	{
		hasher->destroy(hasher);
		return FAILED;
	}
	hasher->destroy(hasher);
	/* we need only the first 8 octets */
	challenge_hash->len = 8;
	return SUCCESS;
}

/**
 * Calculate the challenge response (i.e. expand password_hash to three DES keys
 * and then encrypt the 8-octet challenge_hash with these keys and concatenate
 * the results).
 */
static status_t ChallengeResponse(chunk_t challenge_hash, chunk_t password_hash,
								  chunk_t *response)
{
	int i;
	crypter_t *crypter;
	chunk_t keys[3], z_password_hash;
	crypter = lib->crypto->create_crypter(lib->crypto, ENCR_DES_ECB, 8);
	if (crypter == NULL)
	{
		DBG1(DBG_IKE, "EAP-MS-CHAPv2 failed, DES-ECB not supported");
		return FAILED;
	}
	/* prepare keys: first pad password_hash to 21 octets, these get then split
	 * into 7-octet chunks, which then get expanded into 8-octet DES keys */
	z_password_hash = chunk_alloca(21);
	memset(z_password_hash.ptr, 0, z_password_hash.len);
	memcpy(z_password_hash.ptr, password_hash.ptr, password_hash.len);
	chunk_split(z_password_hash, "mmm", 7, &keys[0], 7, &keys[1], 7, &keys[2]);

	*response = chunk_alloc(24);
	for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
	{
		chunk_t expanded, encrypted;

		expanded = ExpandDESKey(keys[i]);
		if (!crypter->set_key(crypter, expanded) ||
			!crypter->encrypt(crypter, challenge_hash, chunk_empty, &encrypted))
		{
			chunk_clear(&expanded);
			crypter->destroy(crypter);
			return FAILED;
		}
		memcpy(&response->ptr[i * 8], encrypted.ptr, encrypted.len);
		chunk_clear(&encrypted);
		chunk_clear(&expanded);
	}
	crypter->destroy(crypter);
	return SUCCESS;
}

/**
 * Computes the authenticator response
 */
static status_t AuthenticatorResponse(chunk_t password_hash_hash,
		chunk_t challenge_hash, chunk_t nt_response, chunk_t *response)
{
	chunk_t magic1 = chunk_from_chars(
		0x4D, 0x61, 0x67, 0x69, 0x63, 0x20, 0x73, 0x65, 0x72, 0x76,
		0x65, 0x72, 0x20, 0x74, 0x6F, 0x20, 0x63, 0x6C, 0x69, 0x65,
		0x6E, 0x74, 0x20, 0x73, 0x69, 0x67, 0x6E, 0x69, 0x6E, 0x67,
		0x20, 0x63, 0x6F, 0x6E, 0x73, 0x74, 0x61, 0x6E, 0x74);
	chunk_t magic2 = chunk_from_chars(
		0x50, 0x61, 0x64, 0x20, 0x74, 0x6F, 0x20, 0x6D, 0x61, 0x6B,
		0x65, 0x20, 0x69, 0x74, 0x20, 0x64, 0x6F, 0x20, 0x6D, 0x6F,
		0x72, 0x65, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, 0x61, 0x6E, 0x20, 0x6F, 0x6E,
		0x65, 0x20, 0x69, 0x74, 0x65, 0x72, 0x61, 0x74, 0x69, 0x6F,
		0x6E);
	chunk_t digest = chunk_empty, concat;
	hasher_t *hasher;

	hasher = lib->crypto->create_hasher(lib->crypto, HASH_SHA1);
	if (hasher == NULL)
	{
		DBG1(DBG_IKE, "EAP-MS-CHAPv2 failed, SHA1 not supported");
		return FAILED;
	}

	concat = chunk_cata("ccc", password_hash_hash, nt_response, magic1);
	if (!hasher->allocate_hash(hasher, concat, &digest))
	{
		hasher->destroy(hasher);
		return FAILED;
	}
	concat = chunk_cata("ccc", digest, challenge_hash, magic2);
	if (!hasher->allocate_hash(hasher, concat, response))
	{
		hasher->destroy(hasher);
		return FAILED;
	}
	hasher->destroy(hasher);
	chunk_free(&digest);
	return SUCCESS;
}

/**
 * Generate the master session key according to RFC3079
 */
static status_t GenerateMSK(chunk_t password_hash_hash,
							chunk_t nt_response, chunk_t *msk)
{
	chunk_t magic1 = chunk_from_chars(
		0x54, 0x68, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x74,
		0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x4d, 0x50, 0x50, 0x45, 0x20, 0x4d,
		0x61, 0x73, 0x74, 0x65, 0x72, 0x20, 0x4b, 0x65, 0x79);
	chunk_t magic2 = chunk_from_chars(
		0x4f, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x63, 0x6c, 0x69,
		0x65, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x20, 0x73, 0x69, 0x64, 0x65, 0x2c, 0x20,
		0x74, 0x68, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68,
		0x65, 0x20, 0x73, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x64, 0x20, 0x6b, 0x65, 0x79,
		0x3b, 0x20, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x73,
		0x65, 0x72, 0x76, 0x65, 0x72, 0x20, 0x73, 0x69, 0x64, 0x65,
		0x2c, 0x20, 0x69, 0x74, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68,
		0x65, 0x20, 0x72, 0x65, 0x63, 0x65, 0x69, 0x76, 0x65, 0x20,
		0x6b, 0x65, 0x79, 0x2e);
	chunk_t magic3 = chunk_from_chars(
		0x4f, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x63, 0x6c, 0x69,
		0x65, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x20, 0x73, 0x69, 0x64, 0x65, 0x2c, 0x20,
		0x74, 0x68, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68,
		0x65, 0x20, 0x72, 0x65, 0x63, 0x65, 0x69, 0x76, 0x65, 0x20,
		0x6b, 0x65, 0x79, 0x3b, 0x20, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68,
		0x65, 0x20, 0x73, 0x65, 0x72, 0x76, 0x65, 0x72, 0x20, 0x73,
		0x69, 0x64, 0x65, 0x2c, 0x20, 0x69, 0x74, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73,
		0x20, 0x74, 0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x73, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x64, 0x20,
		0x6b, 0x65, 0x79, 0x2e);
	chunk_t shapad1 = chunk_from_chars(
		0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
		0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
		0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
		0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00);
	chunk_t shapad2 = chunk_from_chars(
		0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2,
		0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2,
		0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2,
		0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2);
	chunk_t keypad = chunk_from_chars(
		0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
		0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00);
	char master_key[HASH_SIZE_SHA1];
	char master_receive_key[HASH_SIZE_SHA1], master_send_key[HASH_SIZE_SHA1];
	chunk_t concat, master;
	hasher_t *hasher;

	hasher = lib->crypto->create_hasher(lib->crypto, HASH_SHA1);
	if (hasher == NULL)
	{
		DBG1(DBG_IKE, "EAP-MS-CHAPv2 failed, SHA1 not supported");
		return FAILED;
	}

	concat = chunk_cata("ccc", password_hash_hash, nt_response, magic1);
	if (!hasher->get_hash(hasher, concat, master_key))
	{
		hasher->destroy(hasher);
		return FAILED;
	}
	master = chunk_create(master_key, 16);
	concat = chunk_cata("cccc", master, shapad1, magic2, shapad2);
	if (!hasher->get_hash(hasher, concat, master_receive_key))
	{
		hasher->destroy(hasher);
		return FAILED;
	}
	concat = chunk_cata("cccc", master, shapad1, magic3, shapad2);
	if (!hasher->get_hash(hasher, concat, master_send_key))
	{
		hasher->destroy(hasher);
		return FAILED;
	}

	*msk = chunk_cat("cccc", chunk_create(master_receive_key, 16),
					 chunk_create(master_send_key, 16), keypad, keypad);

	hasher->destroy(hasher);
	return SUCCESS;
}

static status_t GenerateStuff(private_eap_mschapv2_t *this,
							  chunk_t server_challenge, chunk_t peer_challenge,
							  chunk_t username, chunk_t nt_hash)
{
	status_t status = FAILED;
	chunk_t nt_hash_hash = chunk_empty, challenge_hash = chunk_empty;

	if (NtPasswordHash(nt_hash, &nt_hash_hash) != SUCCESS)
	{
		goto error;
	}
	if (ChallengeHash(peer_challenge, server_challenge, username,
						&challenge_hash) != SUCCESS)
	{
		goto error;
	}
	if (ChallengeResponse(challenge_hash, nt_hash,
						&this->nt_response) != SUCCESS)
	{
		goto error;
	}
	if (AuthenticatorResponse(nt_hash_hash, challenge_hash,
						this->nt_response, &this->auth_response) != SUCCESS)
	{
		goto error;
	}
	if (GenerateMSK(nt_hash_hash, this->nt_response, &this->msk) != SUCCESS)
	{
		goto error;
	}

	status = SUCCESS;

error:
	chunk_free(&nt_hash_hash);
	chunk_free(&challenge_hash);
	return status;
}

/**
 * Try to decode the UTF-8 byte sequence utf8 points to and advance the
 * position.  Returns FALSE if the byte sequence is incomplete (the actual
 * values are not validated).
 */
static inline bool decode_utf8(chunk_t *utf8, uint32_t *c)
{
	uint8_t b1, b2, b3, b4;
	int i = 0;

	if (!utf8->len)
	{
		return FALSE;
	}

	b1 = utf8->ptr[i++];
	if (b1 & 0x80)
	{
		if (i == utf8->len)
		{
			return FALSE;
		}
		b2 = utf8->ptr[i++];
		if (b1 < 0xe0)
		{	/* two-byte encoding */
			*c = ((b1 & 0x1f) << 6) | (b2 & 0x3f);
			goto done;
		}
		if (i == utf8->len)
		{
			return FALSE;
		}
		b3 = utf8->ptr[i++];
		if (b1 < 0xf0)
		{	/* three-byte encoding */
			*c = ((b1 & 0x0f) << 12) | ((b2 & 0x3f) << 6) | (b3 & 0x3f);
			goto done;
		}
		if (i == utf8->len)
		{
			return FALSE;
		}
		b4 = utf8->ptr[i++];
		/* four-byte encoding */
		*c =  ((b1 & 0x07) << 18) | ((b2 & 0x3f) << 12) |
			  ((b3 & 0x3f) << 6) | (b4 & 0x3f);
	}
	else
	{	/* single-byte ASCII */
		*c = b1;
	}

done:
	*utf8 = chunk_skip(*utf8, i);
	return TRUE;
}

/**
 * Encode the given code point (or surrogate) as UTF-16LE where utf16 points
 * to and advance the position.
 */
static inline void encode_utf16le_single(chunk_t *utf16, uint16_t c)
{
	if (utf16->len >= 2)
	{
		utf16->ptr[0] = c & 0xff;
		utf16->ptr[1] = c >> 8;
		*utf16 = chunk_skip(*utf16, 2);
	}
}

/**
 * Encode the given code point as UTF-16LE where utf16 points to and advance
 * the position.  Invalid code points are ignored.
 */
static inline void encode_utf16le(chunk_t *utf16, uint32_t c)
{

	if (c >= 0xd800 && (c <= 0xdfff || c > 0x10ffff ||
		(0xfdd0 <= c && (c <= 0xfdef || (c & 0xfffe) == 0xfffe))))
	{	/* ignore code points that are not characters: single surrogates
		 * 0xd800..0xdfff, any value > 0x10ffff, 0xfdd0..0xfdef as per
		 * Unicode 3.1, the last two in each plane 0x__fffe and 0x__ffff. */
		return;
	}
	if (c < 0x10000)
	{	/* BMP code points */
		encode_utf16le_single(utf16, c);
	}
	else
	{	/* supplementary code points are split into two 16-bit surrogates */
		encode_utf16le_single(utf16, 0xd7c0 + (c >> 10));
		encode_utf16le_single(utf16, 0xdc00 | (c & 0x3ff));
	}
}

/**
 * Converts an (assumed) UTF-8 string into a UTF-16 (little-endian) string
 */
static chunk_t utf8_to_utf16le(chunk_t utf8)
{
	chunk_t utf16, buf;
	uint32_t c;

	/* unless the input is ASCII-only this will generally be too much, but
	 * doesn't really matter for the length of strings processed here */
	utf16 = buf = chunk_alloc(utf8.len * 2);

	while (decode_utf8(&utf8, &c))
	{
		encode_utf16le(&buf, c);
	}

	utf16.len = utf16.len - buf.len;

	return utf16;
}

#if DEBUG_LEVEL >= 1
/**
 * sanitize a string for printing
 */
static char* sanitize(char *str)
{
	char *pos = str;

	while (pos && *pos)
	{
		if (!isprint(*pos))
		{
			*pos = '?';
		}
		pos++;
	}
	return str;
}
#endif /* DEBUG_LEVEL */

/**
 * Returns a chunk of just the username part of the given user identity.
 * Note: the chunk points to internal data of the given chunk
 */
static chunk_t extract_username(chunk_t id)
{
	char *has_domain;

	has_domain = (char*)memchr(id.ptr, '\\', id.len);
	if (has_domain)
	{
		int len;
		has_domain++; /* skip the backslash */
		len = id.len - ((u_char*)has_domain - id.ptr);
		return len > 0 ? chunk_create(has_domain, len) : chunk_empty;
	}
	return id;
}

/**
 * Set the ms_length field using aligned write
 */
static void set_ms_length(eap_mschapv2_header_t *eap, uint16_t len)
{
	len = htons(len - 5);
	memcpy(&eap->ms_length, &len, sizeof(uint16_t));
}

METHOD(eap_method_t, initiate_peer, status_t,
	private_eap_mschapv2_t *this, eap_payload_t **out)
{
	/* peer never initiates */
	return FAILED;
}

METHOD(eap_method_t, initiate_server, status_t,
	private_eap_mschapv2_t *this, eap_payload_t **out)
{
	rng_t *rng;
	eap_mschapv2_header_t *eap;
	eap_mschapv2_challenge_t *cha;
	const char *name = MSCHAPV2_HOST_NAME;
	uint16_t len = CHALLENGE_PAYLOAD_LEN + sizeof(MSCHAPV2_HOST_NAME) - 1;

	rng = lib->crypto->create_rng(lib->crypto, RNG_WEAK);
	if (!rng || !rng->allocate_bytes(rng, CHALLENGE_LEN, &this->challenge))
	{
		DBG1(DBG_IKE, "EAP-MS-CHAPv2 failed, no challenge");
		DESTROY_IF(rng);
		return FAILED;
	}
	rng->destroy(rng);

	eap = alloca(len);
	eap->code = EAP_REQUEST;
	eap->identifier = this->identifier;
	eap->length = htons(len);
	eap->type = EAP_MSCHAPV2;
	eap->opcode = MSCHAPV2_CHALLENGE;
	eap->ms_chapv2_id = this->mschapv2id;
	set_ms_length(eap, len);

	cha = (eap_mschapv2_challenge_t*)eap->data;
	cha->value_size = CHALLENGE_LEN;
	memcpy(cha->challenge, this->challenge.ptr, this->challenge.len);
	memcpy(cha->name, name, sizeof(MSCHAPV2_HOST_NAME) - 1);

	*out = eap_payload_create_data(chunk_create((void*) eap, len));
	this->state = S_EXPECT_RESPONSE;
	return NEED_MORE;
}

static bool get_nt_hash(private_eap_mschapv2_t *this, identification_t *me,
					   identification_t *other, chunk_t *nt_hash)
{
	shared_key_t *shared;
	chunk_t password;

	/* try to find a stored NT_HASH first */
	shared = lib->credmgr->get_shared(lib->credmgr, SHARED_NT_HASH, me, other);
	if (shared )
	{
		*nt_hash = chunk_clone(shared->get_key(shared));
		shared->destroy(shared);
		return TRUE;
	}

	/* fallback to plaintext password */
	shared = lib->credmgr->get_shared(lib->credmgr, SHARED_EAP, me, other);
	if (shared)
	{
		password = utf8_to_utf16le(shared->get_key(shared));
		shared->destroy(shared);

		if (NtPasswordHash(password, nt_hash) == SUCCESS)
		{
			chunk_clear(&password);
			return TRUE;
		}
		chunk_clear(&password);
	}
	return FALSE;
}

/**
 * Process MS-CHAPv2 Challenge Requests
 */
static status_t process_peer_challenge(private_eap_mschapv2_t *this,
									   eap_payload_t *in, eap_payload_t **out)
{
	rng_t *rng;
	eap_mschapv2_header_t *eap;
	eap_mschapv2_challenge_t *cha;
	eap_mschapv2_response_t *res;
	chunk_t data, peer_challenge, userid, username, nt_hash;
	uint16_t len = RESPONSE_PAYLOAD_LEN;

	data = in->get_data(in);
	eap = (eap_mschapv2_header_t*)data.ptr;

	/* the name MUST be at least one octet long */
	if (data.len < CHALLENGE_PAYLOAD_LEN + 1)
	{
		DBG1(DBG_IKE, "received invalid EAP-MS-CHAPv2 message: too short");
		return FAILED;
	}

	cha = (eap_mschapv2_challenge_t*)eap->data;

	if (cha->value_size != CHALLENGE_LEN)
	{
		DBG1(DBG_IKE, "received invalid EAP-MS-CHAPv2 message: "
			 "invalid challenge size");
		return FAILED;
	}

	this->mschapv2id = eap->ms_chapv2_id;
	this->challenge = chunk_clone(chunk_create(cha->challenge, CHALLENGE_LEN));

	peer_challenge = chunk_alloca(CHALLENGE_LEN);
	rng = lib->crypto->create_rng(lib->crypto, RNG_WEAK);
	if (!rng || !rng->get_bytes(rng, CHALLENGE_LEN, peer_challenge.ptr))
	{
		DBG1(DBG_IKE, "EAP-MS-CHAPv2 failed, allocating challenge failed");
		DESTROY_IF(rng);
		return FAILED;
	}
	rng->destroy(rng);

	if (!get_nt_hash(this, this->peer, this->server, &nt_hash))
	{
		DBG1(DBG_IKE, "no EAP key found for hosts '%Y' - '%Y'",
			 this->server, this->peer);
		return NOT_FOUND;
	}

	/* we transmit the whole user identity (including the domain part) but
	 * only use the user part when calculating the challenge hash */
	userid = this->peer->get_encoding(this->peer);
	len += userid.len;
	username = extract_username(userid);

	if (GenerateStuff(this, this->challenge, peer_challenge,
					  username, nt_hash) != SUCCESS)
	{
		DBG1(DBG_IKE, "EAP-MS-CHAPv2 generating NT-Response failed");
		chunk_clear(&nt_hash);
		return FAILED;
	}
	chunk_clear(&nt_hash);

	eap = alloca(len);
	eap->code = EAP_RESPONSE;
	eap->identifier = this->identifier;
	eap->length = htons(len);
	eap->type = EAP_MSCHAPV2;
	eap->opcode = MSCHAPV2_RESPONSE;
	eap->ms_chapv2_id = this->mschapv2id;
	set_ms_length(eap, len);

	res = (eap_mschapv2_response_t*)eap->data;
	res->value_size = RESPONSE_LEN;
	memset(&res->response, 0, RESPONSE_LEN);
	memcpy(res->response.peer_challenge, peer_challenge.ptr, peer_challenge.len);
	memcpy(res->response.nt_response, this->nt_response.ptr, this->nt_response.len);
	memcpy(res->name, userid.ptr, userid.len);

	*out = eap_payload_create_data(chunk_create((void*) eap, len));
	this->state = S_EXPECT_SUCCESS;
	return NEED_MORE;
}

/**
 * Process MS-CHAPv2 Success Requests
 */
static status_t process_peer_success(private_eap_mschapv2_t *this,
									  eap_payload_t *in, eap_payload_t **out)
{
	status_t status = FAILED;
	enumerator_t *enumerator;
	eap_mschapv2_header_t *eap;
	chunk_t data, auth_string = chunk_empty;
	char *message, *token, *msg = NULL;
	int message_len;

	data = in->get_data(in);
	eap = (eap_mschapv2_header_t*)data.ptr;

	if (data.len < HEADER_LEN + AUTH_RESPONSE_LEN)
	{
		DBG1(DBG_IKE, "received invalid EAP-MS-CHAPv2 message: too short");
		return FAILED;
	}

	message_len = data.len - HEADER_LEN;
	message = malloc(message_len + 1);
	memcpy(message, eap->data, message_len);
	message[message_len] = '\0';

	/* S=<auth_string> M=<msg> */
	enumerator = enumerator_create_token(message, " ", " ");
	while (enumerator->enumerate(enumerator, &token))
	{
		if (strpfx(token, "S="))
		{
			chunk_t hex;
			token += 2;
			if (strlen(token) != AUTH_RESPONSE_LEN - 2)
			{
				DBG1(DBG_IKE, "received invalid EAP-MS-CHAPv2 message: "
					 "invalid auth string");
				goto error;
			}
			chunk_free(&auth_string);
			hex = chunk_create(token, AUTH_RESPONSE_LEN - 2);
			auth_string = chunk_from_hex(hex, NULL);
		}
		else if (strpfx(token, "M="))
		{
			token += 2;
			free(msg);
			msg = strdup(token);
		}
	}
	enumerator->destroy(enumerator);

	if (auth_string.ptr == NULL)
	{
		DBG1(DBG_IKE, "received invalid EAP-MS-CHAPv2 message: "
			 "auth string missing");
		goto error;
	}

	if (!chunk_equals_const(this->auth_response, auth_string))
	{
		DBG1(DBG_IKE, "EAP-MS-CHAPv2 verification failed");
		goto error;
	}

	DBG1(DBG_IKE, "EAP-MS-CHAPv2 succeeded: '%s'", sanitize(msg));

	eap = alloca(HEADER_LEN);
	eap->code = EAP_RESPONSE;
	eap->identifier = this->identifier;
	eap->length = htons(SHORT_HEADER_LEN);
	eap->type = EAP_MSCHAPV2;
	eap->opcode = MSCHAPV2_SUCCESS;

	*out = eap_payload_create_data(chunk_create((void*)eap, SHORT_HEADER_LEN));
	status = NEED_MORE;
	this->state = S_DONE;

error:
	chunk_free(&auth_string);
	free(message);
	free(msg);
	return status;
}

static status_t process_peer_failure(private_eap_mschapv2_t *this,
									 eap_payload_t *in, eap_payload_t **out)
{
	status_t status = FAILED;
	enumerator_t *enumerator;
	eap_mschapv2_header_t *eap;
	chunk_t data;
	char *message, *token, *msg = NULL;
	int message_len, error DBG_UNUSED = 0;
	chunk_t challenge = chunk_empty;

	data = in->get_data(in);
	eap = (eap_mschapv2_header_t*)data.ptr;

	if (data.len < HEADER_LEN + 3) /* we want at least an error code: E=e */
	{
		DBG1(DBG_IKE, "received invalid EAP-MS-CHAPv2 message: too short");
		return FAILED;
	}

	message_len = data.len - HEADER_LEN;
	message = malloc(message_len + 1);
	memcpy(message, eap->data, message_len);
	message[message_len] = '\0';

	/* E=eeeeeeeeee R=r C=cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc V=vvvvvvvvvv M=<msg> */
	enumerator = enumerator_create_token(message, " ", " ");
	while (enumerator->enumerate(enumerator, &token))
	{
		if (strpfx(token, "E="))
		{
			token += 2;
			error = atoi(token);
		}
		else if (strpfx(token, "R="))
		{
			/* ignore retriable */
		}
		else if (strpfx(token, "C="))
		{
			chunk_t hex;
			token += 2;
			if (strlen(token) != 2 * CHALLENGE_LEN)
			{
				DBG1(DBG_IKE, "received invalid EAP-MS-CHAPv2 message:"
					 "invalid challenge");
				goto error;
			}
			chunk_free(&challenge);
			hex = chunk_create(token, 2 * CHALLENGE_LEN);
			challenge = chunk_from_hex(hex, NULL);
		}
		else if (strpfx(token, "V="))
		{
			/* ignore version */
		}
		else if (strpfx(token, "M="))
		{
			token += 2;
			free(msg);
			msg = strdup(token);
		}
	}
	enumerator->destroy(enumerator);

	DBG1(DBG_IKE, "EAP-MS-CHAPv2 failed with error %N: '%s'",
		 mschapv2_error_names, error, sanitize(msg));

	/**
	 * at this point, if the error is retriable, we MAY retry the authentication
	 * or MAY send a Change Password packet.
	 *
	 * if the error is not retriable (or if we do neither of the above), we
	 * SHOULD send a Failure Response packet.
	 * windows clients don't do that, and since windows server 2008 r2 behaves
	 * pretty odd if we do send a Failure Response, we just don't send one
	 * either. windows 7 actually sends a delete notify (which, according to the
	 * logs, results in an error on windows server 2008 r2).
	 *
	 * btw, windows server 2008 r2 does not send non-retriable errors for e.g.
	 * a disabled account but returns the windows error code in a notify payload
	 * of type 12345.
	 */

	status = FAILED;
	this->state = S_DONE;

error:
	chunk_free(&challenge);
	free(message);
	free(msg);
	return status;
}

METHOD(eap_method_t, process_peer, status_t,
	private_eap_mschapv2_t *this, eap_payload_t *in, eap_payload_t **out)
{
	chunk_t data;
	eap_mschapv2_header_t *eap;

	this->identifier = in->get_identifier(in);
	data = in->get_data(in);
	if (data.len < SHORT_HEADER_LEN)
	{
		DBG1(DBG_IKE, "received invalid EAP-MS-CHAPv2 message");
		return FAILED;
	}

	eap = (eap_mschapv2_header_t*)data.ptr;

	switch (this->state)
	{
		case S_EXPECT_CHALLENGE:
			if (eap->opcode == MSCHAPV2_CHALLENGE)
			{
				return process_peer_challenge(this, in, out);
			}
			break;
		case S_EXPECT_SUCCESS:
			switch (eap->opcode)
			{
				case MSCHAPV2_SUCCESS:
					return process_peer_success(this, in, out);
				case MSCHAPV2_FAILURE:
					return process_peer_failure(this, in, out);
			}
			break;
		default:
			break;
	}
	switch (eap->opcode)
	{
		case MSCHAPV2_CHALLENGE:
		case MSCHAPV2_SUCCESS:
		case MSCHAPV2_FAILURE:
			DBG1(DBG_IKE, "received unexpected EAP-MS-CHAPv2 message with "
				 "OpCode (%N)!", mschapv2_opcode_names, eap->opcode);
			break;
		default:
			DBG1(DBG_IKE, "EAP-MS-CHAPv2 received packet with unsupported "
				 "OpCode (%N)!", mschapv2_opcode_names, eap->opcode);
			break;
	}
	return FAILED;
}

/**
 * Handles retries on the server
 */
static status_t process_server_retry(private_eap_mschapv2_t *this,
									 eap_payload_t **out)
{
	eap_mschapv2_header_t *eap;
	rng_t *rng;
	chunk_t hex;
	char msg[FAILURE_MESSAGE_LEN];
	uint16_t len = HEADER_LEN + FAILURE_MESSAGE_LEN - 1; /* no null byte */

	if (++this->retries > MAX_RETRIES)
	{
		/* we MAY send a Failure Request with R=0, but windows 7 does not
		 * really like that and does not respond with a Failure Response.
		 * so, to clean up our state we just fail with an EAP-Failure.
		 * this gives an unknown error on the windows side, but is also fine
		 * with the standard. */
		DBG1(DBG_IKE, "EAP-MS-CHAPv2 verification failed: "
			 "maximum number of retries reached");
		return FAILED;
	}

	DBG1(DBG_IKE, "EAP-MS-CHAPv2 verification failed, retry (%d)", this->retries);

	rng = lib->crypto->create_rng(lib->crypto, RNG_WEAK);
	if (!rng || !rng->get_bytes(rng, CHALLENGE_LEN, this->challenge.ptr))
	{
		DBG1(DBG_IKE, "EAP-MS-CHAPv2 failed, allocating challenge failed");
		DESTROY_IF(rng);
		return FAILED;
	}
	rng->destroy(rng);

	chunk_free(&this->nt_response);
	chunk_free(&this->auth_response);
	chunk_free(&this->msk);

	eap = alloca(len);
	eap->code = EAP_REQUEST;
	eap->identifier = ++this->identifier;
	eap->length = htons(len);
	eap->type = EAP_MSCHAPV2;
	eap->opcode = MSCHAPV2_FAILURE;
	eap->ms_chapv2_id = this->mschapv2id++; /* increase for each retry */
	set_ms_length(eap, len);

	hex = chunk_to_hex(this->challenge, NULL, TRUE);
	snprintf(msg, FAILURE_MESSAGE_LEN, "%s%s", FAILURE_MESSAGE, hex.ptr);
	chunk_free(&hex);
	memcpy(eap->data, msg, FAILURE_MESSAGE_LEN - 1); /* no null byte */
	*out = eap_payload_create_data(chunk_create((void*) eap, len));

	/* delay the response for some time to make brute-force attacks harder */
	sleep(RETRY_DELAY);

	/* since the error is retriable the state does not change, we still
	 * expect an MSCHAPV2_RESPONSE from the peer */
	return NEED_MORE;
}

/**
 * Process MS-CHAPv2 Response response packets
 */
static status_t process_server_response(private_eap_mschapv2_t *this,
										eap_payload_t *in, eap_payload_t **out)
{
	eap_mschapv2_header_t *eap;
	eap_mschapv2_response_t *res;
	chunk_t data, peer_challenge, username, nt_hash;
	identification_t *userid;
	int name_len;
	char buf[256];

	data = in->get_data(in);
	eap = (eap_mschapv2_header_t*)data.ptr;

	if (data.len < RESPONSE_PAYLOAD_LEN)
	{
		DBG1(DBG_IKE, "received invalid EAP-MS-CHAPv2 message: too short");
		return FAILED;
	}

	res = (eap_mschapv2_response_t*)eap->data;
	peer_challenge = chunk_create(res->response.peer_challenge, CHALLENGE_LEN);

	name_len = min(data.len - RESPONSE_PAYLOAD_LEN, 255);
	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%.*s", name_len, res->name);
	userid = identification_create_from_string(buf);
	if (!userid->equals(userid, this->peer))
	{
		DBG1(DBG_IKE, "EAP-MS-CHAPv2 username: '%Y'", userid);
	}
	/* userid can only be destroyed after the last use of username */
	username = extract_username(userid->get_encoding(userid));

	if (!get_nt_hash(this, this->server, userid, &nt_hash))
	{
		DBG1(DBG_IKE, "no EAP key found for hosts '%Y' - '%Y'",
					  this->server, userid);
		/* FIXME: windows 7 always sends the username that is first entered in
		 * the username box, even, if the user changes it during retries (probably
		 * to keep consistent with the EAP-Identity).
		 * thus, we could actually fail here, because retries do not make much
		 * sense. on the other hand, an attacker could guess usernames, if the
		 * error messages were different. */
		userid->destroy(userid);
		return process_server_retry(this, out);
	}

	if (GenerateStuff(this, this->challenge, peer_challenge,
					  username, nt_hash) != SUCCESS)
	{
		DBG1(DBG_IKE, "EAP-MS-CHAPv2 verification failed");
		userid->destroy(userid);
		chunk_clear(&nt_hash);
		return FAILED;
	}
	chunk_clear(&nt_hash);

	if (memeq_const(res->response.nt_response, this->nt_response.ptr,
					this->nt_response.len))
	{
		chunk_t hex;
		char msg[AUTH_RESPONSE_LEN + sizeof(SUCCESS_MESSAGE)];
		uint16_t len = HEADER_LEN + AUTH_RESPONSE_LEN + sizeof(SUCCESS_MESSAGE);

		eap = alloca(len);
		eap->code = EAP_REQUEST;
		eap->identifier = ++this->identifier;
		eap->length = htons(len);
		eap->type = EAP_MSCHAPV2;
		eap->opcode = MSCHAPV2_SUCCESS;
		eap->ms_chapv2_id = this->mschapv2id;
		set_ms_length(eap, len);

		hex = chunk_to_hex(this->auth_response, NULL, TRUE);
		snprintf(msg, AUTH_RESPONSE_LEN + sizeof(SUCCESS_MESSAGE),
					  "S=%s%s", hex.ptr, SUCCESS_MESSAGE);
		chunk_free(&hex);
		memcpy(eap->data, msg, AUTH_RESPONSE_LEN + sizeof(SUCCESS_MESSAGE));
		*out = eap_payload_create_data(chunk_create((void*) eap, len));

		this->auth->add(this->auth, AUTH_RULE_EAP_IDENTITY, userid);
		this->state = S_EXPECT_SUCCESS;
		return NEED_MORE;
	}
	userid->destroy(userid);
	return process_server_retry(this, out);
}

METHOD(eap_method_t, process_server, status_t,
	private_eap_mschapv2_t *this, eap_payload_t *in, eap_payload_t **out)
{
	eap_mschapv2_header_t *eap;
	chunk_t data;

	if (this->identifier != in->get_identifier(in))
	{
		DBG1(DBG_IKE, "received invalid EAP-MS-CHAPv2 message: "
			 "unexpected identifier");
		return FAILED;
	}

	data = in->get_data(in);
	if (data.len < SHORT_HEADER_LEN)
	{
		DBG1(DBG_IKE, "received invalid EAP-MS-CHAPv2 message: too short");
		return FAILED;
	}

	eap = (eap_mschapv2_header_t*)data.ptr;

	switch (this->state)
	{
		case S_EXPECT_RESPONSE:
			if (eap->opcode == MSCHAPV2_RESPONSE)
			{
				return process_server_response(this, in, out);
			}
			break;
		case S_EXPECT_SUCCESS:
			if (eap->opcode == MSCHAPV2_SUCCESS &&
				this->msk.ptr)
			{
				return SUCCESS;
			}
			break;
		default:
			break;
	}
	switch (eap->opcode)
	{
		case MSCHAPV2_FAILURE:
			/* the client may abort the authentication by sending us a failure
			 * in any state */
			return FAILED;
		case MSCHAPV2_RESPONSE:
		case MSCHAPV2_SUCCESS:
			DBG1(DBG_IKE, "received unexpected EAP-MS-CHAPv2 message with "
				 "OpCode (%N)!", mschapv2_opcode_names, eap->opcode);
			break;
		default:
			DBG1(DBG_IKE, "EAP-MS-CHAPv2 received packet with unsupported "
				 "OpCode (%N)!", mschapv2_opcode_names, eap->opcode);
			break;
	}
	return FAILED;
}

METHOD(eap_method_t, get_type, eap_type_t,
	private_eap_mschapv2_t *this, pen_t *vendor)
{
	*vendor = 0;
	return EAP_MSCHAPV2;
}

METHOD(eap_method_t, get_msk, status_t,
	private_eap_mschapv2_t *this, chunk_t *msk)
{
	if (this->msk.ptr)
	{
		*msk = this->msk;
		return SUCCESS;
	}
	return FAILED;
}

METHOD(eap_method_t, get_identifier, uint8_t,
	private_eap_mschapv2_t *this)
{
	return this->identifier;
}

METHOD(eap_method_t, set_identifier, void,
	private_eap_mschapv2_t *this, uint8_t identifier)
{
	this->identifier = identifier;
}

METHOD(eap_method_t, is_mutual, bool,
	private_eap_mschapv2_t *this)
{
	return FALSE;
}

METHOD(eap_method_t, get_auth, auth_cfg_t*,
	private_eap_mschapv2_t *this)
{
	return this->auth;
}

METHOD(eap_method_t, destroy, void,
	 private_eap_mschapv2_t *this)
{
	this->peer->destroy(this->peer);
	this->server->destroy(this->server);
	this->auth->destroy(this->auth);
	chunk_free(&this->challenge);
	chunk_free(&this->nt_response);
	chunk_free(&this->auth_response);
	chunk_free(&this->msk);
	free(this);
}

/**
 * Generic constructor
 */
static private_eap_mschapv2_t *eap_mschapv2_create_generic(identification_t *server, identification_t *peer)
{
	private_eap_mschapv2_t *this;

	INIT(this,
		.public = {
			.eap_method_interface = {
				.get_type = _get_type,
				.is_mutual = _is_mutual,
				.get_msk = _get_msk,
				.get_identifier = _get_identifier,
				.set_identifier = _set_identifier,
				.get_auth = _get_auth,
				.destroy = _destroy,
			},
		},
		.peer = peer->clone(peer),
		.server = server->clone(server),
		.auth = auth_cfg_create(),
		.state = S_EXPECT_CHALLENGE,
	);

	return this;
}

/*
 * see header
 */
eap_mschapv2_t *eap_mschapv2_create_server(identification_t *server, identification_t *peer)
{
	private_eap_mschapv2_t *this = eap_mschapv2_create_generic(server, peer);

	this->public.eap_method_interface.initiate = _initiate_server;
	this->public.eap_method_interface.process = _process_server;

	/* generate a non-zero identifier */
	do
	{
		this->identifier = random();
	} while (!this->identifier);

	this->mschapv2id = this->identifier;

	return &this->public;
}

/*
 * see header
 */
eap_mschapv2_t *eap_mschapv2_create_peer(identification_t *server, identification_t *peer)
{
	private_eap_mschapv2_t *this = eap_mschapv2_create_generic(server, peer);

	this->public.eap_method_interface.initiate = _initiate_peer;
	this->public.eap_method_interface.process = _process_peer;

	return &this->public;
}
